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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No.  06-1427
FOREST GILLIAM,
             Appellant
v.
RONNIE HOLT
___________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-02351)
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo
___________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 7, 2006
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed:  July 25, 2006)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
PER CURIAM
 Appellant Forrest Gilliam appeals from the denial of his habeas corpus petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  The Appellee filed a motion for summary action.  Because no
substantial question is presented, we will grant the Appellee’s motion.  See L.A.R. 27.4.
2I.
On July 25, 2005, Gilliam was charged with the high severity disciplinary
infraction “fighting.”  Gilliam admitted to the charges at a hearing before a Disciplinary
Hearing Officer (“DHO”).  The DHO sanctioned him with thirty days of disciplinary
segregation, forfeiture of twenty-seven days of future good-time credit, loss of sixty days
of non-vested good-time credit, and the loss of telephone and visiting privileges.  On
November 14, Gilliam filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claiming that the
sanctions he received were racially motivated and excessive, prison officials improperly
ordered his transfer, and officials incorrectly processed the return of another inmate.  The
District Court denied the petition.  It concluded that only the claims relating to the denial
of good-time credit were cognizable under § 2241 and that the sanctions imposed did not
violate due process.  
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and because the issues in this
case are purely legal, we exercise plenary review.  See Roussos v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159,
161 n.3 (3d Cir. 1997); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 479 (3d Cir. 1990).  Claims
brought under a § 2241 petition must challenge the fact or duration of a sentence or
confinement.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Leamer v. Fauver, 288
F.3d 532, 540-42 (3d Cir. 2002).  Gilliam’s challenges to the loss of privileges, his
transfer, placement in the special housing unit, and the processing of other prisoners do
3not implicate the fact or length of his sentence.  Thus, the District Court properly declined
to address these matters.
With respect to his loss of good-time credit, his claim can be construed to raise two
points.  First, that the discipline was imposed in violation of due process, and second, that
his discipline was racially motivated, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  
Federal inmates possess a liberty interest in good-time credit.  See Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-57 (1974); Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir.
1991).  Wolff provides a set of minimum procedural protections that must apply to prison
disciplinary proceedings.  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556.  In order to meet the minimum
requirements of procedural due process, the disciplinary findings must be supported by
“some evidence” in the record.  Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472
U.S. 445, 454 (1985).  The prison and DHO afforded Gilliam all of the procedural
protections required by the Constitution, and Gilliam’s admission certainly satisfies the
“some evidence” standard.  Additionally, his discipline conforms with the sanctions
permitted under 28 C.F.R. § 514.13, table 3, Code 201.  His due process rights were not
violated.
The District Court did not address the possible equal protection claim, but we find
no evidence of a violation.  The Equal Protection Clause requires that all people similarly
situated be treated alike.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985).  Gilliam’s single allegation that one Caucasian inmate received a lesser sanction
for the same disciplinary infraction does not amount to evidence of discriminatory
4treatment.  See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (holding that petitioner
must show purposeful discrimination which had a discriminatory effect on the petitioner). 
Gilliam admitted to the offense and was sanctioned in conformity with the regulation.  He
fails to show that his sanction was motivated with a discriminatory purpose or that it had
a discriminatory effect.
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the Appellee’s motion and will affirm the
order of the District Court.  Gilliam’s motion to adopt the District Court record is denied
as moot.
